Prediction markets are futures markets in which prices are used to predict future events. I derive the equilibrium price when traders are risk-neutral price takers with heterogenous beliefs. I find that price is a particular quantile of the distribution of traders' beliefs. Price does not reveal the mean belief that traders hold but does yield a bound on the mean belief.
Introduction
Prediction markets are futures markets in which prices are used to predict future events. Consider an all-or-nothing contract paying a dollar if a specified event occurs and nothing otherwise. Proponents of prediction markets have interpreted the price of such a contract as a "market probability;" that is, a marketgenerated likelihood that the event will occur. Yet the arguments for this interpretation have been imprecise.
Introducing the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) to the research community, Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and Wright (1992) sought authority in Hayek (1945) , who argued broadly but vaguely that market prices aggregate information. Hayek put it this way (p. 526): "The mere fact that there is one price for a commodity . . . . brings about the solution which . . . . might have been arrived at by one single mind possessing all the information which is in fact dispersed among all the people involved in the process."
In a recent review article, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) wrote (p. 108): "In a truly efficient prediction market, the market price will be the best predictor of the event, and no combination of available polls or other information can be used to improve on the market-generated forecast." The expression "efficient prediction market" refers to the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which posits that price is a sufficient statistic for all private information held by traders. However, the EMH is only a hypothesis that may hold in some settings; it is not a universal truth.
This report presents the first formal analysis of price determination in prediction markets where traders have heterogeneous beliefs. I consider a simple and illustrative setting, where traders are risk-neutral price takers with finite trading budgets. I report three findings: (a) the equilibrium price of a predictionmarket contract is a particular quantile of the budget-weighted distribution of traders' beliefs; (b) price does not reveal the mean belief that traders hold but does yield a bound on the mean belief; (c) the equilibrium price remains the same if traders use price data to revise their beliefs in some ways.
Although these findings are new to the study of prediction markets, finding (a) has previously been obtained in a study of pari-mutuel betting on horse races. Considering races with two horses, Ali (1977) reported the equilibrium condition (1) that I independently derive below. He suggested that this may explain the "favorite-longshot bias," where horses with high equilibrium prices (i.e., favorites) empirically tend to win more often and those with low prices (i.e., longshots) tend to win less often than they should if their prices are interpreted as market probabilities of race outcomes.
Price Determination
Consider a prediction market offering all-or-nothing contracts on the occurrence of a binary event;
one contract pays a dollar if event m occurs and the other pays a dollar if the contrary event n / (not m) occurs. Let the contract prices be B m and B n , where B m + B n = 1. It will be shown below that equilibrium prices satisfy this "no-arbitrage" condition.
Suppose that a large population J (formally a continuum) with heterogeneous beliefs participate in this market; without loss of generality, let the unit interval index the members of J. Let each person j have a fixed trading budget of y j dollars and a subjective probability q jm that event m will occur. Let P(q m , y) denote the cross-sectional distribution of beliefs and budgets. Let the distribution of beliefs be continuous, with budgets initially being statistically independent of beliefs. Finally, let traders be price takers who maximize the subjective expected value of their contracts.
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium price for contract m in a prediction market such as the IEM solves the equation
Thus, most persons have beliefs higher than price when price is above 0.5, and most have beliefs lower than price when price is below 0.5. The equilibrium price is unique and generically equals the (1!B m )-quantile of the distribution of beliefs. Equation (1) Finally, suppose that trading budgets and beliefs are statistically dependent rather than independent.
Then equation (2) shows that the equilibrium price depends on the conjunction of traders' budgets and beliefs rather than on their beliefs alone. Although equation (1) does not hold as stated, this equation does hold if one redefines J to be the population of dollars traded rather than the population of traders.
Bound on Mean Beliefs
It follows from equation (1) To obtain the lower bound, observe that the distribution that satisfies equation (1) To see that the equilibrium price is unchanged, replace the equilibrium condition (2) that held using prior beliefs with the analogous condition using posterior beliefs; that is, . Hence, the equilibrium price using posterior beliefs is the same as the one using prior beliefs.
Postscript
The analysis of this paper demonstrates the danger of loosely interpreting prices in prediction markets as "market probabilities" that aggregate the information held by traders. I suggest that my specific findings about the relationship between price and the distribution of traders' beliefs should be applied cautiously to actual prediction markets, where traders may or may not behave in the manner assumed here.
Circulation of the first draft of this paper in early 2004 stimulated other researchers to study price determination when the assumption of risk neutrality in my analysis is replaced by various assumptions of risk aversion. Working independently of one another, Gjerstad (2005) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) show that equilibrium price is the mean belief E(q m ) if all traders maximize the subjective expected value of the logarithm of their contracts. Other forms of risk aversion imply other relationships between price and the distribution of trader beliefs. These findings, in conjunction with my own, make plain that interpretation of prices in actual prediction markets requires knowledge of traders' risk preferences.
